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Abstract
This paper develops a simple game between the IMF a county
and a set of atomistic private investors. The model is motivated
by the case of Argentina. Under reasonable assumptions, the one
shot game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Consider-
ing an equilibrium in mixed strategies, conditions are derived on
whether the IMF should exist. A “cooperative ﬁrst best” may be
supported in a repeated game by a “minimum punishment strat-
egy” that may be optimal but may break down if the probability
of insolvency rises. This implies that countries are likely to de-
viate in bad times placing the IMF in an “impossible position”.
It is suggested that the international ﬁnancial architecture (IFA)
remains incomplete.
Key Words: International Monetary Fund, International Fi-
nancial Architecture, Sovereign Default.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There has been a long standing joke that the acronym IMF really
stands for Its Mostly Fiscal. However, the model in this paper suggests
a tension between what might be thought of as, Its Mostly Fundamentals
∗We would like to thank Martin Besefamile and Juan Pablo Nicolini for valuable
comments and all the attendees of the Economics seminar at the UTDT and of the
IMF research department seminar. Andrew Powell would like to thank the IMF
for support. Part of this paper was written while Powell was a Visiting Scholar at
the IMF in 2002. All mistakes remain our own. Comments welcome to: apow-
ell@utdt.edu
1and a Fund that attempts to Impetrate Market Feelings1.T h i st e n s i o n
can also be thought of as that between "moral hazard" versus "liquidity
protection". The "moral hazard school" of thought stresses the classic
perverse incentive problem created by insurance type interventions in
capital markets. Adherents to this school point to the sheer size of IMF
led packages, the very low emerging country spreads after the assistance
to Mexico in 1995 and the "lending boom" to emerging economies and
stress the idea that countries might consider packages as substitutes to
safer policies or needed reforms. According to this school of thought,
the role of the IMF should then be limited and lending policies and
instruments should be designed to reduce moral hazard as far as possi-
ble. The resolution of country payments’ crises is then seen largely as
a problem between the unfortunate country and its private creditors.
In contrast, the liquidity school stresses a set of potential failures in
international capital markets. In particular, adherents point to asym-
metric information between lenders and borrowers and co-ordination
failures between lenders giving rise to problems including multiple equi-
libria. According to this school, ﬁnancial markets may be subject to
inherent instability, and consequent "sudden stops" or "runs" in capital
ﬂows may prove extremely costly for the countries concerned. Indeed,
proponents tend to suggest that while countries that suﬀer such runs may
have structural weaknesses that make them more vulnerable to attack,
nevertheless the "punishment" is frequently worse than the "crime". Ac-
cording to this view, the Fund may have an important role in stabilizing
capital markets allowing them to function more smoothly and ensuring
that market prices reﬂect more accurately country fundamentals. One
view is that the IMF should then act as a provider of liquidity to re-
solve lender coordination problems. Indeed simply the credible promise
of liquidity may eliminate the incentives for investors to "run". Other
ideas in the literature suggest that the Fund may act directly as a co-
ordinating device aﬀecting equilibrium selection or through its informal
powers of persuasion and more formal conditionality, the IMF may aﬀect
the perceptions of investors and contain the problem of moral hazard.
If information problems are rife, then the IMF may also act as a type
of honest broker, again potentially reducing the possibility of unstable
outcomes2.
1W i t ha p o l o g i e st ot h e o l o g e a n s ,t oi m p e t r a t em e a n st oa s ks o m e t h i n gf r o mG o d-
there is a signiﬁcant discussion in the Catholic church whether sinners can impetrate.
2On the issues of moral hazard versus liquidity protection see for example Calvo
(2002), Dooley (2000), Haldane and Krug (2000), Eichengreen and Ruhl (2001),
Meltzer (forthcoming) and Rubini (2002). Of these authors, Meltzer and arguably
Haldane and Krug fall into the ’moral hazard’ camp while Calvo is clearly in the
’liquidity school’. Dooley provides the moral- hazard critique of a too easy a debt
2These appear to be quite opposite views of the world and hence
somewhat diﬃcult to reconcile. However, in this paper a simple model
is developed that encompasses both views. Indeed it is suggested that,
as both schools are right, it is precisely the tension between them that
makes the task of the IMF so diﬃcult and arguably places the Fund in
an "impossible position". While one approach is to criticise particular
IMF decisions, the view advanced here is that it is more constructive to
consider the structural problem that might lead to an understanding of
the policies adopted.
To a large extent, the model and the discussion is motivated by events
in Argentina especially through 2001. The tension between the moral
hazard school and the liquidity school was particularly evident in the
Fund’s actions in this case3. The pertinent observation is that, given
the policies adopted in Buenos Aires the Fund became more and more
uncomfortable with continuing its support, but there was also an acute
awareness that withdrawal would surely provoke a liquidity run, deval-
uation and default - the crisis that Argentina was precisely trying to
avoid. Powell (2003) analyzes the development of the Argentine crisis
and suggests that with a major IMF led support package in place at the
end of 2000, Argentina then implemented more risky policies aimed at
reviving the real economy but with a decreasing probability of success.
In March 2001, with the resignation of the second economy minister in as
many months, there is a strong argument that the IMF had a decision to
make; either support strongly or withdraw. But the perception was that
the IMF vacillated. Policy developments in Argentina were assessed
by private agents in terms of how they aﬀected the probability of the
IMF program continuing. The implementation of an ingeneous system
of export subsidies and import tariﬀs in July 2001, where those subsidies
and tariﬀs were determined by the dollar/euro exchange rate, raised the
fear that this might be interpreted by the IMF as a dual exchange rate
regime and hence provide the excuse for the IMF to withdraw. This
helped provide the trigger for a bank run that was then halted by the
IMF package of August 2001. The package halted the bank run but
as the economy continued to deteriorate, tax revenues fell and the IMF
targets became more diﬃcult to meet, again depositors speculated that
the IMF would withdraw and Argentina would default and a full scale
run developed again in November sparking a set of bank controls in
resolution and Rubini provides an encompassing discussion that is a good motivation
for our model below. Eichengreen and Ruhl (2000) is perhaps the closest model in
spirit to ours although the equilibrium of the one stage game is quite diﬀerent and
they do not consider a repetition of the one stage game.
3For an interesting account of that relationship see Mussa (forthcoming).
3early December. This experience suggests that the IMF plays an im-
portant role in coordinating atomistic investors and providing liquidity
protection and that IMF withdrawal may be met with a liquidity run of
signiﬁcant proportions.
The analysis presented also suggests that the international ﬁnancial
architecture (IFA) remains incomplete. The theoretical model is used
to consider recent proposals such as collective action clauses and bank-
ruptcy procedures. Collective action clauses are found to be ineﬀective
in the context of a one-shot game, potentially useful in the context of a
repeated game, but for a range of reasonable parameter values, quantita-
tively not particularly important. Moreover, it is argued that collective
action clauses cannot solve a fundamental problem regarding those un-
fortunate countries that ﬁnd themselves nearing default. It is argued
that a bankruptcy procedure, properly designed, may oﬀer a country an
alternative to adopting a more risky strategy given a "deterioration in
fundamentals" and that this might make all parties better oﬀ ex ante.
The paper is organized as followings. In Section 2 a simple one shot
game is outlined. In the context of that game we are able to analyze
interesting questions as to what the form of the equilibria may be, how
collective action clauses may aﬀect the form of equilibria and under what
conditions the existence of the IMF raises country welfare. Given an
assumption regarding IMF preference, we are also able to address the
question, under what conditions would the IMF wish the IMF to exist!
Unfortunately, however, it is well known that one shot games are wrong
in that games are in real life repeated but that at the same time it is
always diﬃcult to ﬁnd a unique equilbrium in a repeated game frame-
work. In section 3, we consider a repetition of the game and address
the uniqueness problem by showing that in an interesting region of pa-
rameter values the optimum policy for the Fund is a type of "minimum
punishment strategy". This result has interesting implications for the
debate regarding the international ﬁnancial architecture which are taken
up in the concluding section 4.
2 A model of country, IMF, private sector interac-
tions
In this section, we develop a simple game with three actors; namely the
IMF a country and a large number, N, of small private investors. The
game has 3 periods, and the timeline is depicted in Figure 14.I n t h e
4We adopt the terminology that the game in this section has three periods. Later,
when we consider repeating the game, we refer to these three periods as one stage.
4ﬁrst period, the N private investors oﬀer 1/N via a debt contract to
the country. We do not seek to explain why this partricular contract
is used here, we take that as a given. We assume that if any individual
private investor wishes to liquidate her position at the end of the second
(intermediate) stage she may and in that case the contract stipulates
that she should be paid an intermediate payment, rI/N, otherwise the
contract pays r/N at the end of the second period. Later we will
solve for r to make the interest rate endogenous but rI will remain
ﬁxed and exogenous. In fact rI can be set equal to 1 (i.e.: simply
returning the capital invested or another amount subject to some, not
particularly tight, restrictions)5. After the debt contract is oﬀered, there
then follows a simultaneous game between the country and the IMF. The
simultaneous play is assumed to reﬂect the fact that countries cannot
commit to particular policies. In the case of the IMF it would appear
more reasonable to assume that this institution might be able to commit.
However, it turns out that it would not want to. In other words for the
IMF there is a ﬁrst-move disadvantage. The view here is then that the
country and the IMF should be considered as playing a simultaneous
game as the country cannot commit and the IMF does not want to. For
simplicity, it is assumed that the country and the IMF have only two
choices. The country can play either Safe or Risky and that the IMF
can play Assist or no-Assist6.
First, consider the structure of the game without the IMF. If the
country plays Safe, it invests the money extended to it in a project of
relatively safe technology. This technology implies that if the project is
maintained until stage 3, then there is no possibility of "country insol-
vency". We assume that for the safe technology there is a probablity x
5See Jeanne (2002) for an interesting and related model. In that paper the author
endogenizes elements of the debt contract but only considers a one shot and not a
repeated game. Moroever, the timing is diﬀerent and in the end moral hazard can
be controlled as the country’s eﬀort level can be observed before an IMF package
is agreed. We suggest here that it is more realistic that the IMF is faced with the
decision to assist in the face of a potential run without knowledge of how the country
is acting reﬂecting a country commitment problem.
6It is relatively easy to picture the Fund’s ﬁrst mover disadvantage. If the Fund
commits to Assist, then the country will choose Risky - we will assume that the Fund
will wish to avoid this "moral hazard" outcome. If the IMF does not Assist, then the
country may choose Safe but is not protected from the possibility of a liquidity run.
In both cases the Fund regrets what it did given the country’s choice. If somehow
the country could commit, then if the country chooses Risky the Fund would not
Assist and we assume that the country would prefer to play Safe as the Fund would
then Assist. The problem is that we assume that the country cannot commit so the
country might say it will play Safe, get the Fund’s Assistance and then play Risky,
and of course the Fund will anticipate this.
5at the end of period 3 that the project returns h and a probability 1−x
that the project returns l where h>l>r . The safe technology then
implies no risk of insolvency. Moreover, we assume for simplicity that
if the country can pay its debts then it will pay its debts. In this sense
the model is an "ability to pay" model. The diﬀerence between ability
to pay and willingness to pay is not the focus of this game and indeed
it makes little diﬀerence to what follows which approach is chosen given
certain conditions on the cost of default which we address later on.
While the safe technology implies no risk of insolvency if the project
is maintained until stage 3, the country may be subject to a "pure"
liquidity problem. If the project is liquidated in period 2 we assume
that the project returns either a with probability x or b with probability
1 − x,w h e r ea>r I >b . We assume that it is known whether the
country has a or b available for repayment. This implies that if the
country is unlucky, then the atomistic investors, that know that only
b<r I is available if the project is liquidated, may have an incentive to
run. In general there is a multiple equilbrium problem here. We will
assume in what follows that if there is a multiple equilibrium, investors
will run. Later, we develop a condition that show when private investors
will always run if the country is unlucky such that in fact there was no
multiple equilibrium.7.
To be more precise, after the simultaneous game between the IMF
and the country is played the N private sector investors get to decide
whether they want to liquidate their investments early or not. Let us as-
sume that there is a sequential service constraint such that if they decide
to liquidate then this occurs randomly on a ﬁrst come ﬁrst served basis
and hence if there is insuﬃcient resources in total those who are lucky
enough to get out ﬁrst will receive the intermediate payment rI/N while
the country has suﬃcient funds and the remainder obtain zero. In the
case where there are insuﬃcient resources, then ex ante we will assume
that each of the N investors has the same probability of being one of the
lucky ones who got out ﬁrst and obtained the interim payment. This
means that each investor has the probability b/rI of receiving the interim
payment rI. Hence the expected return to each investor conditional on
the country being unlucky is a return of b. What this boils down to is
that, if the country chooses the safe technology, then with probability
7Another approach would be to posit that investors select the run or non-run
equilibrium depending on a sunspot variable which with a certain probability implies
that the run equilibrium will be selected - see Jeanne (2002) for a model incorporating
this feature. In practice, in our case, this simply implies adding another parameter.
Indeed one interpretation of the probability x would be that it already incorporates
this second sunspot- derived probability.
61 − x there will be a "pure liquidity run" and the country will end up
being insolvent and defaulting with investors getting expected return
b in that case, even though if investors had not run, insolvency would
have been averted8. In this unfortunate case, the country defaults on
its contract and suﬀers a penalty which again we assume is exogenous
and equal to F.
On the other hand, if the country plays Risky, it invests in a tech-
nology that indeed has a probablity of failure at the end of period 3 and
hence there is a probability of insolvency even if the project is maintained
until completion. However, this riskier technology also has a probability
of a higher return. Suppose that with probability y the project yields a
payoﬀ of t and with probability (1−y) ap a y o ﬀ of −u where t>r ,u>0
such that with probability (1−y), the country cannot pay its debts if the
project is maintained to completion. However, we also need to specify
what happens again in the intermediate period. Again let us assume
that the project, if liquidated in period 2, returns either a or b with the
probabilities, y or (1 − y) respectively. As before, it is known whether
the country can obtain a or b if the project is liquidated at that stage.
Note now that if it is known that the country only has b available then
neither investors, nor the IMF, knows whether the country had chosen
the risky or safe technology. Once again we simply assume that if this
is the case investors will run. If it was the case that the country had
chosen the risky technology, and was unlucky, then of course this liq-
uidity run simply brings forward the default from period 3 to period
2. The only diﬀerence is that in this case the liquidity run happened
on the road to insolvency, whereas in the case of the safe technology, it
might be thought of as a pure liquidity run. However, at stage 2 only
the country knows what kind of run it was facing. Again, if the country
defaults, it suﬀers the same default penalty as above.
In period 3, everything is revealed and debts are paid if they can be
paid. At the end of period 3, everyone knows how the country played
(Risky or Safe) and everyone knows whether the project returned the
higher or the lower return appropriate to the technology selected. If the
country has the resources to pay oﬀ i t sd e b t s ,t h e ni ti sa s s u m e dt h a ti t
will do so. However, we note that the country cannot arrive at period 3
with insuﬃcient resources. In that case, the country would have already
defaulted in period 2.
Now, let us turn to the role of the IMF. If the IMF Assists then this
8Of course a more conmplex model might have two continuous distributions for
the intermediate payoﬀ from the Safe or Risky technologies and the known resources
available in the intermediate period then being a noisy signal of one of those distri-
butions.
7is taken to mean that the IMF oﬀers the country an irrevocable Stand-
by which the country can use in the intermediate or ﬁnal period of the
game. As noted above at period 2, neither the IMF nor the private sector
knows whether the country has chosen the risky or the safe technology so
it follows that the Stand-by cannot be made conditional on that choice.
Further we assume that the amount of the stand-by is ﬁxed at c.W e
assume that c>r I −b and that c>r−u. These conditions imply that
the Stand-by is suﬃcient to both (a) solve a potential pure liquidity run -
in the case that the country plays Safe but has bad luck but also (b) bail
out private creditors - if the country is insolvent having played Risky and
having had bad luck. It would be useful for the IMF if rI−b<r−u and
the size of the stand-by, c, set such that the IMF could resolve a liquidity
problem without providing a full bail out. We will in general assume
that this is not the case9. Consistent with the spirit of this ability to pay
model, we further assume that the Stand-by is used only if the country
actually needs to use the funds. Hence, if the IMF Assists and the
country plays Safe, then it turns out that the Stand-by will be simply
preventative in nature. Given that the liquidity is available if the country
needs it, this will ensure that the run equilibrium no longer exists and
s on or u nw i l la c t u a l l yo c c u ra n dt h ec o u n t r yw i l ln o ta c t u a l l yn e e dt h e
IMF’s funds. However, if the country chooses the Risky technology and
is unlucky, the Stand-by will again protect the country against the run
equilibrium in the intermediate period and will also protect the country
against insolvency at the end of period 3. We assume that the country
will then use the Stand-by to pay oﬀ (bail out) the private investors10.
The IMF is then playing a dual role in this model. As the liquidity
school would have it, there is a role of the IMF in correcting a type of
market failure or externality, namely the possibility of a liquidity run.
On the other hand, and in line with the moral hazard school, the IMF
also may end up bailing out private sector investors and, as we shall see,
thereby creating moral hazard.
2.1 The Country’s Payoﬀs
We are now in a position to thinnk about the expected payoﬀsi nt h e
simultaneous game between the country and the IMF at the end of
9If the IMF could commit to a size of stand by that solved the liquidity problem
but did not provide a full bail out, and a partial default still led to the full assumed
cost of default, F, for the country most likely there would be no moral hazard in this
model.
10While we do not go into details this might be justiﬁed in a willingness to pay
model where the costs of default on the private sector are greater than the costs of
drawing down the Stand-by even though it is known that the IMF will ﬁnd out that
the country has played Risky.
8period 1. The country can play either Safe or Risky and the IMF can
play Assist or No-Assist. After this nature then plays (good luck versus
bad luck) and depending on the outcome of the game and nature the
private sector will run or not in the intermediate period. We can then
write the expected payoﬀs for the four outcomes for the Country/IMF
simultaneous game. We label these four outcomes: (1) The First Best,
(2) Moral Hazard (3) On your own and (4) the Worst Case.
1. The First Best
I nt h eF i r s tB e s tt h ec o u n t r yp l a y sS a f ea n dt h eI M FA s s i s t s . T h e
payoﬀ to the country can be expressed as:
A = xh +( 1− x)l − r (1)
where we know that the project is never liquidated early and x
is the probabilty of the technology being successful and r is the
loan repayment to the private sector (we assume zero discounting
between the diﬀerent stages of the one-shot game). Note here
that although the IMF oﬀers the Stand-by, and that is crucial in
obtaining the above payoﬀ above avoiding the possiblity of a run,
these resources are not actually used.
2. Moral Hazard
This outcome refers to the case where the IMF Assists and the
country plays Risky. The payoﬀ to the country is given by:
C = yt+( 1− y)(c − u) − r (2)
where c is the cash received from the IMF in the case where the
country is unlucky and the project fails.
3. On Your Own
T h i so u t c o m ei sw h e r et h ec o u n t r yp l a y sS a f ea n dt h eI M Fr e -
sponds with No Assist. In this case the payoﬀ to the country
is:
B = x(h − r) − (1 − x)F (3)
where in the case that the country is lucky and the project is
successful, the country can pay oﬀ its private creditors at the end
of the period. However if the country is unlucky, with probability
91− x, there is a liquidity run, the country uses up all its available
resources and then defaults. The cost of default is given by F.
4. The Worst Case
The Worst Case is when the country plays Risky and the IMF does
not Assist. Here the payoﬀ to the country is given by:
D = y(t − r) − (1 − y)F (4)
where again if the country is lucky (this time with probabiltiy,
y) then the country gets to keep the rewards of the project on
completion and pays oﬀ private creditors. However, if the country
is unlucky, once again there will be a liquidity run (of course there
would have been a solvency problem at the end of stage 3 anyway)
and the country defaults.
2.2 The IMF’s Payoﬀs
1. We assume that the IMF essentially has the country’s best inter-
e s ta th e a r tb u tw i t hj u s to n ed i ﬀerence. We assume that the
IMF does not like the Moral Hazard outcome and hence has some
disutility attached to that particular outcome relative to the coun-
try payoﬀ. One way to think about this is that it is only in
that case that the IMF’s resources actually get used. So, another
justiﬁcation of this idea is that the IMF needs to raise funds to
ﬁnance the use of its liquidity and hence the parameter reﬂect-
ing the Fund’s disutility for this outcome reﬂects that ﬁnancing
requirement. This implies that the payoﬀs for the IMF are very
easy to deﬁne and are simply:
2. The First Best
A = xh +( 1− x)l − r (5)
3. Moral Hazard
C − λ = yt+( 1− y)(c − u) − r − λ (6)
4. On Your Own
B = x(h − r) − (1 − x)F (7)
5. The Worst Case
D = y(t − r) − (1 − y)F (8)
10Where λ is the cost to the IMF of supporting a country that plays
Risky and potentially needing to draw down on the Stand-by, not
for liquidity but for solvency purposes. We illustrate the payoﬀs
in a simple 2*2 matrix in Figure 2.
2.3 Equilibria
We suggest here that under reasonable values of the parameters, there
is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium to this game. In particular, note
that A>B ,a sxr+(1−x)l>−(1−x)F. Note that for there to be moral
hazard C>A . This might be thought of as a condition on the minimum
size of a Stand-by, namely: (c−u)(1−y) > (1−x)l−(yt−xh)11. Note
that if there is no moral hazard then there is really no problem in the
sense that it turns out that the First Best would be a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. It also seems reasonable to assume that λ will be such that
the IMF will prefer not to Asisit if the country prefers Risky (C−λ<D )
or in other words λ>y r+( 1− y)(c − u + F)12.Finally we assume that
B>D . If this is not the case, the Worst Case is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium implying that the IMF will not Assist and the country will






and we note that yt > xh and x>yis a natural condition implying
that the Risky technology is indeed more risky and hence we suggest that
for the risky technology to be riskier, the numerator and the denominator
of the fraction will both be positive. This expression says that if the
cost of default is not high enough, then in fact the Worst Case may be a
pure Nash equilibrium. However, much of the recent the literature has
stressed that the cost of default is indeed high, perhaps too high, and
11A slightly simpler version of the model has c = u+r and l = r in which case this
condition can be written as (x −y)r>−(yt−xh) and a suﬃcient condition for this
to be satisﬁed is x>yand yt > xh which is a natural condition for what is meant
by risky versus safe.
12We note that if this is not the case then the Moral Hazard outcome may be a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This is indeed the assumption in Eichengreen and
Ruhl (2000). However, given that the IMF decided (eventually) to pull out of both
Russia and Argentina this view seems highly questionable. Indeed, in the case of
Argentina private sector spreads were at 3000 basis points over US Treasuries, 1-2
months before the default - hardly levels expecting another bail-out as would be
suggested according to that equilibrium.
11recent proposals on ﬁnancial architecture reform take this as a starting
point13. Here we assume that the cost of default is high enough to
prevent the Worst Case being a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and
hence that this condition is met.
It follows that if A > B,C > A,C − λ<D ,B>Dthen there is no
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. However, as is well known, there is
a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. It is straightforward to show
that in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the country plays Safe with a
probability q given by:
q =
D − (C − λ)
D − (C − λ)+( A − B)
w h i c hi sw r i t t e ni ns u c haw a ys u c ht h a ti ti se a s yt os e et h a t0 <
q<1 given the conditions above. The probability that the IMF plays
Assist is given by p such that:
p =
B − D
B − D +( C − A)
again written such that it is easy to verify that 0 <p<1.
Recently, there has been intensive discussion regarding the role of the
IMF. However to date the idea that there is no pure strategy equilibrium
to a very basic game of country/IMF interactions has not been suggested.
And yet this does appear to be a very real possibility. We note that
in the mixed strategy equilibirum there is a positive probability of IMF
assistance and the country chosing Risky (with probability p(1−q))a n da
possibility that the country suﬀers a pure liquidity run with probability
q(1 − p)(1 − x) and a possibility that the country suﬀers a liquidity
run because of an underlying problem of insolvency with probability
(1 − q)(1 − p)(1 − y).
Now let us consider the returns to the private investors. It follows
that they now have a probability of, S = p +( 1− p)(qx +( 1− q)y)
of obtaining the return r (if the country is assisted or if the country
is not assisted but is lucky, either with the Safe or Risky technology.
However, if the country is not assisted and is unlucky it will only have
resources b and will suﬀer a liquidity run. In that case some lucky
investors, b/rI will obtain the promised intermediate return rI and the
13Of course there are important exceptions. The Meltzer report might be in-
terpreted as considering that countries may need to default at times and implicitly
therefore suggests that default costs may not be too high.
12remainder, it is assumed here, will obtain zero. Hence in the case of no
IMF assistance and bad luck which will happen with probabiltiy (1−S)
the expected return will be rIb/rI = b. Assume risk neutrality and a
perfectly competitive market for such investors and hence the return r
that they should demand is given by the equation:
rS + b(1 − S)=rF
where rF is the risk-free rate. It is easy to show that this can be
re-written as:
r = rF +
(rF − b)(1 − S)
S
It is clear that (rF −b) must be positive for if this were not the case
then lending to the country would certainly be no worse than lending
at the risk free rate and might be better, so this equation says that the
return demanded by private sector investors is the risk free rate plus a
risk premium. The higher is b, (expected return in the worst case ie:
a liquidity run) then the lower is the risk premium. The higher is S,
the probability that the private sector will receive the full contractural
payment at the end of period 3, then again the lower wll be the risk pre-
mium. This equation then allows us to investigate how diﬀerent changes
in the underlying parameters might aﬀect a country’s risk premium.
One interesting feature is how the probability that a country plays
Safe depends on the parameter λ. It is easy to show that
dq
dλ > 0 and
indeed this gives one interesting interpretation of what perhaps some
recent lobbying activities may have been attempting to achieve14.I f
the IMF’s preferences can be altered such that the IMF more strongly
dislikes having its resources actually used, then this will, according to
the equilbrium of the one shot game, increase the probability that a
country will play Safe. This is then perhaps one interpretation of what
might be referred to as the activities of moral hazard school economists!
Now, consider the welfare of the players. Welfare of the country,
WC, and of the IMF, WIMF, are given by:
WC = pA +( 1− p)B





13respectivley. Now consider what happens to the welfare of the coun-
try as the cost of default, F, is decreased - which might be thought of
as the introduction of collection action clauses. It turns out that the
change in welfare of the country is ambigious. Indeed it turns out to
be quite complicated. On the one hand as the cost of default falls, all
things being equal, the probability of IMF assistance falls making the
country worse oﬀ. However, reducing the cost of default also increases
welfare as if the country is unlucky and is not assisted then the resulting
default is ex post less costly. Finally reducing the cost of default also
increases the probabilty of the country playing risky and increases the
interest rate that the country is charged by the private sector. The
implication of all of this is that there may be an optimum cost of default
and in general the optimal cost of default, if chosen by the country, may
be diﬀerent to that if chosen by the IMF. Unfortunately, it appears dif-
ﬁcult to get neat analytic solutions but below we investigate these issues
in a simulation exercise.
We now turn to the question of whether the IMF should exist. First,





it is easy to show that the country would choose to play Safe and
hence the interest rate that the private sector would demand would be
given by:
rx = rF +
(rF − b)(1 − x)
x
It is not obvious whether rx <ror vice versa and indeed this turns
out to depend on the paremeters of the model. It is clear from the
equations above that rx <ras x>S , and this turns out to be the case
if:
p<
x − (qx+( 1− q)y)
1 − (qx+( 1− q)y
(11)
which can be thought of as a critical value pc where it is clear that
0 <p c < 1. So if the probability of IMF assistance is greater than this
critical value then the interest rate that the private investors will demand
will be less given the existence of the IMF than otherwise. Note that
this is more likely the larger is x relative to y and as x tends to unity.
Now we are in a position to develop some particularly simple condi-
tions for whether the IMF should or should not exist. Note that for the
country to be better oﬀ with the IMF existing, the welfare in the mixed
strategy equilibrium (with interest rate r) should be greater than Brx
14where this indicates the payoﬀ B but calculated with the interest rate
demanded by the private sector equal to rx.The welfare of the country
in the mized strategy equilibrium is just pAr +(1−p)Br where Ar >B r
and where the subscript r is simply to remind us that these payoﬀsa r e
evaluated at interest rate, r.A s u ﬃcient condition that the IMF im-
proves the welfare of the country is then very simply that rx >r .S o a
very simple suﬃcient condition is that p>p c.
Now, consider whether the IMF would prefer that the IMF did not
exist! The IMF welfare without the IMF is just Brx whereas the welfare
of the IMF in the mixed strategy equilibirum is qBr +( 1− q)Dr where
again the r subscripts refer to the evaluation of these payoﬀsw i t ht h e
interest rate, r.A sD<B ,as u ﬃcient condition that the IMF should
n o te x i s t( f o rt h eI M F ) ,i st h a trx <ror equivalently p<p c.In that case
the IMF would prefer that the IMF did not exist. The conclusion is then
that for the IMF to have a useful role, it must be the case that rx <ror
p>p c .T h i s i s s u ﬃcient to improve country welfare and necessary to
improve the IMF’s welfare. In other words, for the IMF to have a role,
the IMF must do something. The characterization here is that if the
IMF reduces interest rates such that they are less than the interest rate
that would have prevailed without the IMF, then that is necessary for
the IMF that the IMF exists and suﬃcient to increase country welfare.
It is interesting that this reduction in interest rates does not just come
from "moral hazard" in the sense that, with the IMF, the country may
get bailed out, but also because the existence of the IMF reduces the
probability of a liquidity run which also results in default in this model.
It turns out that a necessary and suﬃcient condition that the IMF








This says that for the IMF to exist rx must exceed r by a margin (as
F>r +
yt−xh
x−y was a condition we imposed before in order to ensure that
the Worst Case was not a pure strategy Nash equilibrium) which depends
on the cost of default, F. If the cost of default is just equal to the critical
value to ensure the mixed strategy equilibrium ( F = r+
yt−xh
x−y ), then the
necessary and suﬃcient condition is the same as the suﬃcient condition
stated above (rx <ror equivalently p<p c). However, if the cost
of default is higher, then the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the
IMF to exist appears stricter. The existence of the IMF must push
the interest rate down further below the interest rate that would prevail
if the IMF did not exist. This is intuitive as the model has the IMF
15solving a potential liquidity problem but making a potential solvency
problem worse (moral hazard) but remember that the IMF bails out the
country’s solvency problem if it Assists. Now if the cost of default rises,
the condition says that for the IMF to be happy playing the one shot
game, it must be the case that the IMF pushes down the interest rate
more or in other words that the liquidity problem must be worse.
To place this discussion in the terms of the debate surrounding col-
lective action clauses we might posit the following. If currently the cost
of default is very high, then the IMF only has a useful role if liquidity
problems are very important relative to moral hazard and thanks to the
IMF’s existence, interest rates are much lower for lending to emerging
economies. If this is not the case, then those who argue against the
IMF’s role may have a point. However, these "moral hazard" school
economists should not point to the fact that interest rates are low to
make their case. Indeed, the fact that the IMF reduces interest rates
is a necessary condition that the IMF should exist even in a model that
includes moral hazard! Now, collective action clauses reduce the extent
that the IMF should reduce interest rates to ensure that the IMF has
a useful role. However, if collective action clauses reduce the cost of
default too much, then the equilibrium of the one shot game is no longer
in mixed strategies but rather becomes the Worst Case pure strategy
equilibrium where the country plays Risky, the IMF does not assist and
the IMF has no role.
It is helpful to present a numerical example which will also prove
useful in the subsequent sections regarding repeating the game. In box
1w ep r e s e n tas e to fp a r a m e t e rv a l u e s . W eﬁnd that for these parameter
values the probability that the country would play safe, q,i s86% and
that the IMF would assist, p,i s58% in the mixed strategy equilibrium.
The (net) interest rate that the private sector would charge is 8.5%.
We ﬁnd that the probability S is 94% or on other words that there is a
94% chance that the project (risky or safe) would be carried through to
completion and that the private sector would not run and would receive
the ﬁnal payout with the corresponding interest (8.5%). These numbers
imply that there is about a 50% chance (86%∗56%) of the IMF solving
a pure liquidity problem and an 8.3% chance (56%∗14%) that the IMF
will assist and the country play Risky (Moral Hazard) and a 3.2% chance
(56%∗14%∗40%) chance that the IMF will bail out a country that has
adopted a Risky strategy and has been unlucky. In this case, we ﬁnd
that the critical probability for IMF existence, from the standpoint of
the country, is that p should be greater than 0.3 as this ensures that the
interest rate in the mixed strategy equilibrium is less than the interest
16rate without the IMF where the country always plays Safe. As the
probability of assistance in the mixed strategy equilbrium is 58%,t h e
condition is satisﬁed so there is a rationale for IMF existence from the
standpoint of the country. However, in this example the IMF’s welfare
with the IMF existing is lower than the IMF’s welfare if the IMF did
not exist. In other words, while the IMF lowers the interest rate for the
country ensuring that country welfare is increased with the IMF, it does
so at too high cost from the standpoint of the probability of using IMF
resources and hence IMF welfare.
3 Repeating the game
While our numerical example did not result in a rationale for the exis-
tence of the IMF (from the standpoint of the IMF), this is not, of course,
the end of the story. In this section we investigate repeating the game
described above which we now refer to as the sub-game or one stage of
a repeated game. We assume no discounting between the three peri-
ods of the sub-game but we do include discounting between the stages
(sub-games) of the multi-stage game. As is well known, the literature
on repeated games has not tended to oﬀer very robust conclusions due
to problems of indeterminacy15. However, the game presented has some
characteristics that allow us to make some progress. First, we have a
reaosnably clear First Best where the country plays Safe and the IMF
Assists. This is indeed the best outcome for the IMF. It seems reason-
able to think that the IMF’s welfare is that of some world social planner.
This means that if the players could somehow cooperate to obtain this
outcome, then the IMF (world) welfare would be maximized. Second,
the game in the previous section has a unique Nash equilibrium. We
assume that the only "punishment" available to the IMF in order to at-
tempt to convince countries to "cooperate" and play Safe is playing the
mixed strategy of the Nash equilibrium of this game. More speciﬁcally,
we consider two possibilities. First, we consdier the case where the IMF
can play a "grim trigger" strategy forever. In other words, the IMF can
say to a country, play the First Best or suﬀer the alternative of the Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies forever. Second, we consider a slightly
more complex case where one of the parameters of the game can change
between two values subject to a transition probability matrix. It turns
out that, if the probablity of being unlucky and the project failing when
the country chooses Risky rises, then the country has a greater incentive
15See any standard game theory book - Binmore (1992) provides a lively discussion
- and see Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) for technical details and discussion.
17to deviate. This implies that there might be a punishment strategy
available to the IMF such that cooperation is just assured when this
probability is low but even the grim trigger strategy is not enough to
ensure cooperation when this probability rises above a critical value. If
this is the case, then it may be optimal for the IMF to play a minimum
punishment strategy that just ensures cooperation in the "good times"
but admits the possibility of deviation in the "bad times" (where the
IMF can do nothing except play the mixed strategy of the Nash equi-
librium). As this strategy is optimal for the IMF, then this allows us
to resolve the problem of indeterminacy at least for a relevant range of
paremeter values. We then use this benchmark to consider other possi-
bilities and to discuss implications regarding the international ﬁnancial
architecture.
3.1 The IMF plays a grim trigger strategy
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is attractive for its simplicity and is useful to
analyze also as motivation for the next subsection. We presume that
the IMF can oﬀer the country the First Best coupled with the threat
that if the country deviates to play Risky, then the IMF will respond
with the Nash (mixed strategy) equilibrium forever. This we refer to as
the grim trigger strategy. First, note that for the IMF the First Best is
indeed the best outcome in terms of its payoﬀs. Second, note that the
payoﬀ in the First Best for the country is better than the payoﬀ in the
mixed strategy equilibtrium. This implies that the grim trigger strategy
may well be able to support the First Best as an equilibrium outcome16.
In particular , for the First Best to be supported it must be that, for
the country, playing Safe forever and hence obtaining A each stage, is
preferred to deviating and obtaining C in one stage and then obtaining







where δ is the discount factor between the diﬀerent stages (subgames).
As is standard, this equation can be rearranged to show that the First
Best is supported when this discount factor is greater than a critical
value:
16We do not analyze here whether the IMF would actually wish to implement the
grim trigger strategy forever once the country had deviated. We assume that this is
the case because, for example, the IMF is dealing with many countries at the same





where we known that both the numerator and the denominator are
positive and that A>W C. Hence this critical value for δ is less than
unity. After substituting in for the payoﬀs and some algebra this can
also be written as:
δ>1 −
(1 − x)(l − r + F)
(1 − y)(c − u − r + F)
(15)
where again we know from conditions already imposed that both the
numerator and denominator of the fraction are positive. Interestingly
we can also rearrange this as a condition on (1−y).I n o t h e r w o r d s t h e
First Best is only supported if (1− y) is below a critical value given by:
(1 − y)
∗ =
(1 − x)(l − r + F)
(1 − δ)(c − u − r + F)
(16)
There is a simple case of this model where the IMF lends just enough
to bail the country out ie: c = r+u and l = r (remember also that c+b>
rI) and then this expression basically boils down to 1−y<(1−x)/(1−δ)
which is less than unity for δ<x. However, in our view, for the IMF
to stop the liquidity run it is likely that it would have to provide more
than just c = u + r making this condition more easily satisﬁed.
This analysis shows that, at least subject to this grim trigger, coop-
eration is feasible and if the parameter values are appropriate then the
country will choose Safe and the IMF will Assist. If this is the case
then the private sector will demand the risk free interest rate and the
existence of the IMF is welfare improving both for the country and for
the IMF.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h e r ei sac r i t i c a lv a l u eo f1 − y (the probabilty of
insolvency if the country plays Risky) is interesting for the following
reason. Suppose that a country’s fundamentals are deteriorating, then
we would expect that 1−y would be rising (and rising faster than 1−x,
or in other words the risky technology is becoming more risky). This
means that at some point it is likely that the country would deviate.
Hence it seems likely that a country would deviate as its fundamentals
deteriorated but before it actually defaulted.
The intuition behind this result is the following. As a country’s
fundamentals, as represented by y, deteriorate then if the country did
deviate it would expect to be assisted with higher probability ie:
dp
dy > 0
19in the mixed strategy equilibrium. This implies that deviation (play-
ing risky) becomes relatively more favorable despite the fact that if the
country does play risky, the probability that the country will be unlucky
(1 − y) rises. This discussion however reveals a shortcoming of this
simple trigger analysis. If y is ﬁxed, then the above implies cooperation
forever or no cooperation forever. If y can change then surely the play-
ers should take this into account ex ante. Indeed this would change the
payoﬀs and hence the various parameters of the game.
3.2 A minimum punishment strategy
In considering more complex punishment strategies we are immediately
confronted with the problem of indeterminacy in that, as is well-known
in game theory, almost anything could happen. However, the structure
of the game above suggests that there might be a unique, "minimum
punishment strategy" that might actually be optimal for the IMF17.
Suppose that y can take on 2 values, yH and yL and that there is a
symmetric probability transition matrix such that the probability of y
remaining in the state that it is in is z a n do fc h a n g i n gs t a t ei s1 − z.
In general we might think that z>0.5 to model some persistence in
this parameter. We assume for now that the IMF cannot condition its
punishment on the currenct state of y. Then, given the structure of the
game as analysed above, there is then a possibility that the IMF may
wish to adopt a punishment strategy that (just) ensures cooperation
if y = yH and admits the fact that the country will deviate if y =
yL.We are not necessarily suggesting that this is a realistic description
of what the IMF actually does, however, if we can show that under
certain circumstances it may be optimal then it is a useful benchmark
to compare other possible strategies that would be deﬁnition be sub-
optimal.
We also need to think a little bit more about the timing of the model.
Let us suppose, ﬁrst of all, that the IMF cannot punish a country that
has not already deviated. This assumption then rules out the possibility
that the IMF antcipates deviation and brings forward the "punishment"
and ensures that the Moral Hazard outcome is observed for at least one
period18. A s s u m et h a tw es t a r ti nt h eF i r s tB e s ta n dt h a ty = yH.
The idea is then that there may be some minimum punishment that the
17The minimum punishment strategy is associated with Green and Porter (1984)
- see also the discussion in Tirole (1988), section 6.7.1 pages 262-265. However, the
set up here, is quite diﬀerent.
18Mussa (forthcoming) presents an interesting discussion of the relations between
Argentina and the IMF explaining why the IMF did not abandon its program earlier
which would precisely support this assumption.
20IMF can apply (which we will specify as a minimum number of periods,
N∗, of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the one-stage game), that
ensures that it is in the best interest of the country to continue to play
the First Best if y = yH but that there is no alternative to deviation if
y = yL ( i no t h e rw o r d se v e ni ft h eI M Fp l a y e dt h em i x e ds t r a t e g yN a s h
equilibrium of the one stage game forever - the grim trigger -then that
would not be enough to ensure cooperation at y = yL). If that is the
case, then this minimum punishment strategy would then be an optimal
strategy for the IMF.
The equilibrium strategies for the country and the IMF are then as
follows:
The Country’s Strategy: If the IMF cooperated last period (played
Assist) and if y = yH, then the country will cooperate (play Safe) this
period. If the IMF cooperated last period and if y = yL, then the
country will now deviate (play Risky). If the country played Risky
(and the IMF played Assist) last period then the Country will play Safe
and Risky according to the mixed strategy equilibrium of the one shot
game for N∗ periods after which if y = yH it will return to playing Safe
(cooperate) or if y = yL it will again play Risky (deviate).
The IMF: The IMF will cooperate (play Assist) if the country co-
operated (played Safe) last period. If the country deviated last period
(played Risky), then the IMF will play Assist and No Assist according
to the mixed strategy equilibrium of the one shot game for N∗ periods.
The following period the IMF will play Assist19.
We then deﬁne the following:
1. The value function of cooperating when y = yH
VC/H = A + δ(zVC/H +( 1− z)VD/L) (17)
where the C/H subscript indicates cooperation when y = yH and
D/L deviation when y = yL. What this says is that the value of
cooperating today when y = yH is the payoﬀ from this period, A, plus
the discounted value of cooperating tomorrow (if y = yH tomorrow) and
deviating tomorrow (if y = yL tomorrow).
2. The value function of deviating when y = yH
19An alternative assumption is that the IMF must actually see the country playing
Safe again after the punishment period is over. The minimum punishment strategy is
then stochastic as it is the ﬁrst period after N∗ periods when y = yH. This introduces
some complications to the analysis for very little gain in intuition. Moreover, if the
punishment period is suﬁciently long and the discount factor suﬃciently less than
one such minor diﬀerences in how the punishment is speciﬁed will have negligable
quantitative eﬀects.
21VD/H = CH + δ(VMP/H) (18)
where the MP subscript indicates the minimum punishment and
VMP/H is the value of the minimum punishment starting at y = yH.
3. The value function of cooperating when y = yL
VC/L = AL + δ(zVD/L +( 1− z)VC/H) (19)
4. The value function of deviating when y = yL
VD/L = CL + δ(VMP/L) (20)
where VMP/L is the value of the minimum punishment starting at








where WL is the payoﬀ to the country in the mixed strategy equilib-
rium with y = yL and WH the payoﬀ in the mixed strategy equilibrium








For the equilibrium proposed we need to show that:
VC/H >V D/H (23)
and that
VC/L <V D/L (24)
The equations (17)-(24) deﬁne a highly rescursive system and there
are no analytical solutions. However, we can make progress in the
following way. Consider applying the grim punishment strategy ie: the
mixed strategy equilibrium of the one shot game forever. Now, if such
a grim punishment is tough enough to get cooperation at y = yH but
not tough enough to obtain coperation at y = yL then that is suﬃcient
22for the minimum punishment strategy equilibrium to exist.20.I n o t h e r
words, one way to proceed is to replace the VMP/L and VMP/H with VG/L
and VG/H (where the G subscript is for grim) and then investigate the
region of parameter values where (23) and then (24) just hold. It turns
out that in this way we can now solve the above systems for regions of the
parameters z and δ where the minimum punishment strategy equilibrium
exists. More speciﬁcally, for the constraint that VD/L = VC/L and setting
VMP/L =VG/L and VMP/H =VG/H we ﬁnd that:
δ =
CL − A
CL − WLz − WH(1 − z)
(25)
Where CL is the payoﬀ to deviation (the moral hazard outcome)
when y = yL
21. This equation then gives a boundary of critical values of
δ for diﬀerent values of z such that the grim punishment strategy just
allows cooperation when y = yL.W h e n δ exceeds this critical value
then cooperation at y = yL becomes feasible and hence the minimum
punishment strategy equilibrium breaks down. For the condition VD/H =
VC/H and setting VMP/H =VG/H we ﬁnd that:







which yields a quadratic solution for δ in terms of z as follows:
δ = −M−
s
(M)2 − 4(CH − A)(CL(1 − z)+CHz − WH +2 z(1 − z)(WH − WL)
2(CL(1 − z)+CHz − WH +2 z(1 − z)(WH − WL)
(27)
20This is slightly loose as we have speciﬁed the punishment strategy as a number
of periods of the one shot game Nash equilibrium mixed strategies. Hence there is
an integer problem. However, we will disregard the integer problem for the purposes
of this discussion.
21We note that A the payoﬀ to the country and the IMF in the First Best is the
same whether y = yH or y = yL as the country is playing Safe and the interest rate
charged by the private sector is the risk free rate as the country is cooperating and




(M)2 − 4(CH − A)(CL(1 − z)+CHz − WH +2 z(1 − z)(WH − WL)
2(CL(1 − z)+CHz − WH +2 z(1 − z)(WH − WL)
(28)
where:
M = CH(1 + z)+CL(1 − z) − WL(1 − z) − WHz
and where CH is the payoﬀ to deviation (the moral hazard outcome)
when y = yH We ﬁnd in numerical simulations that the second root
tends to return values of δ>1,s ow ef o c u so u ra t t e n t i o no nt h eﬁrst
root. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the two schedules intersect and we ﬁnd
simple expressions for δ and for z,in terms of the parameters at that
point of intersection:
z =
A(CH − CL + WH − WL)+CLWL − CHWH
(2A − CH − CL)(WH − WL)
(29)
δ =
CH + CL − 2A
CH + CL − WH − WL
(30)
In the appendix (to be completed) we develop conditions where the
relevant solutions for z and δ are both between zero and one and where
the solution of VC/L = VD/L has a positive slope (dδ/dz is positive) and
the solution of VC/H = VD/H has a negative slope (dδ/dz is negative).
If this is the case at the point of intersection, then we know that there
is indeed a range of parameter values where the minimum punishment
strategy equilibrium exists. Consider the numerical example introduced
before. In this case we can trace out the two boundaries to illustrate
the range of parameters where the minimum punishment strategy equi-
librium exists:
The Graph in the text (Figure 3) plots the two boundaries (with z on
the X-axis and δ on the Y-axis) and as shown they do indeed intersect
in the space 0 <z<1,0 <δ<1 and with the expected slopes. To
the right of this intersection between the two curves is then the region
where the minimum punishment strategy exsts and is optimal. To the
right of the intersection, above the upper curve, cooperation has become
feasible at y = yL and hence a punishment strategy that also ensures
cooperation at that point may be preferred and below the lower curve
cooperation is infeasbible even with the grim trigger strategy at y = yH.







4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In the one stage game described above there is a unique Nash equi-
librium. However, this equilibrium is one in mixed rather than pure
strategies. Remember also that even if the IMF wished to commit to
a strategy before the country plays, it would not want to. There is
a ﬁrst-mover disadvantage for the IMF. Moreover, it seems reasonable
to suppose that the country cannot commit - otherwise the whole dis-
cussion of moral hazard is quite irrelevant. What this implies is that
if cooperation cannot develop, the IMF is in a diﬃcult position. On
the one hand, the Fund would like to provide liquidity protection and
stabilize capital markets but on the other hand it fears moral hazard.
The only equilibrium in the one stage game is where it only assists with
some probability in order to keep countries guessing and hence reduce
the moral hazard problem. If cooperation cannot be supported, then
whether the IMF should exist or not (from the standpoint of the IMF)
appears a very open question. If the IMF did not exist, then the model
suggests countries will play Safe but may suﬀer liquidity runs. If the
IMF always assisted it would solve the problem of the liquidity runs but
at the cost of moral hazard. Given the mixed strategy equilibrium,
where the IMF assists with some probability, the IMF has a role if the
25problem of liquidity runs is large relative to the problem of moral hazard.
If the interest rate that would prevail, without the IMF, were less than
that with the IMF’s existence, then this suggests that moral hazard is
the graver problem and this is a suﬃcient condition that the IMF has
no constructive role. For the IMF to have a constructive role, it must
reduce interest rates. This would then suggest that the liquidity pro-
tection was important relative to the moral hazard. We note that this
discussion is at odds with the standard view that low interest rates, as
a result of IMF actions, is a sign of moral hazard and hence a potential
problem.
If cooperation can be supported then it is, of course, much more
likely that the IMF has a constructive role to play. In particular, if
the IMF can play a "grim trigger strategy" and countries are relatively
patient, then cooperation may be supported and the IMF can solve the
liquidity problem without introducing moral hazard at all. However,
evidence suggests that the IMF does not play a grim trigger as while
assistance has been withdrawn from countries - presumably because the
IMF decided the particular country had adopted a set of policies that
should not be supported - assistance has been subsequently put back in
place after policies changed. Unfortunately, as is well known, in repeated
games there is a chronic problem of indeterminacy of equilibria. Here,
we assume that the only punishment available to the IMF is to play
the unique Nash equilibrium of the one stage game. So, depending on
how much punishment the IMF can inﬂict (how many periods of the
mixed strategy equilibrium are played to punish), the opportunities for
cooperation may be large or small. If the IMF cannot punish at all, or
can only punish for one or two stages, then the parameter values where
cooperation is supported will be much more limited.
However, it is also the case that as some parameters of the model
change, then the incentives for cooperation alter. In particular, perhaps
somewhat counter-intuitively, as the probability of being unlucky rises,
so too does the probability of being assisted in the mixed strategy equi-
librium and this implies that there is a greater incentive to deviate. In
the game considered above, if the probability of being unlucky in the case
of Risky play rises, it may be the case that even with the grim trigger
punishment strategy, cooperation cannot be supported. This then gives
rise to the possibility that there is an optimal "minimum punishment"
regime whereby the IMF plays a number of periods of the mixed strat-
egy equilibrium to just ensure cooperation under one set of parameter
values but then the country deviates under a diﬀerent set of parameter
values. As detailed, under this strategy proﬁle, deviation will tend to
occur when the probability of being unlucky if the country plays Risky
26(and hence the probability of insolvency) rises.
This is not necessarily a realistic description of what the IMF actually
does but as it may be an optimal strategy it is a useful benchmark. An
interesting implication of this benchmark is that countries are likely to
deviate before they default as when the probability of insolvency rises,
the incentives to deviate increase and it is only after deviation that the
IMF withdraws and default is possible. Hence the prediction of this
case is that if the risk of insolvency rises, countries may tend to deviate,
the IMF will respond with the mixed strategy equilibrium and countries,
if they are unlucky, will then default during the "minimum punishment"
period.
One aspect of this strategy proﬁle is that it is assumed that the IMF
adopts the same "minimum punishment" whether the country deviates
at y = yH or y = yL (the higher and lower values of being lucky under
Risky play). This minimum being deﬁned as the number of stages
of the mixed strategy equilibrium that just ensures cooperation if y =
yH. However, it might be suggested that the IMF should condition its
punishment on the realization of y. In other words suppose the risk
of insolvency rises, should the IMF punish more or less? If the IMF
could credibly commit to punishing more, then cooperation might be
supported for longer. However, it seems diﬃcult to argue that the IMF
should punish more when the risk of insolvency has risen. After all, this
is simply a parameter of the model and outside the country’s control.
Why should the IMF punish a country more that has deviated when
insolvency risk is higher? Indeed one might expect the IMF to punish a
country less severely as insolvency risk increases. If this is the case then
cooperation will be supported only under a stricter set of parameter
conditions, and deviation may occur more frequently. We therefore
think that while the minimum punishment strategy proﬁle may appear
to be somewhat special case, the idea that countries will deviate as
insolvency risk increases is true more generally under reasonable strategy
proﬁles.
This discussion implies that the IMF is in a very awkward position.
If we start from the situation of a country cooperating, it means that
if for some reason insolvency risk increases, a country may deviate and
the IMF may have to respond with punishment ie: the mixed strategy
play of the one period game. And as we have mentioned, the country if
it is unlucky will then default within the punishment period. Of course
within the mixed strategy play of the punishment period, the country
may default as a consequence of a pure liquidity run or a liquidity run
preempting insolvency - as under the mixed strategy equilibrium there
is a probability of the country playing Safe, playing Risky and of the
27IMF assisting or not assiting.
This sequence of events suggested by this analysis mirrors closely
those related to Argentina, especially during 2001 and 2002. Arguably
(see Powell 2003 for a detailed account), Argentina and the IMF "co-
operated" during most of the 1990’s and a major assistance package,
known as the "blindaje", was arranged in late 2000. Argentina then
went through 3 economy ministers in as many months as a political
scandal regarding spending cuts highlighted the political limits to ﬁscal
adjustment. Powell (2003) suggests that at that point Argentina devi-
ated and the IMF became increasingly uncomfortable with the policies
adopted. Some may put the date of deviation earlier (not enough public
sector savings during the "good times") or later (with a massive bond
swap in May or in November 2001 with an attempt to control inter-
est rates and dollarize the ﬁnancial system), changing the details of the
story but not the main message. It might be argued that with three
Economy Ministers in as many months, the IMF had a decision to make;
either withdraw or support Argentina strongly. However as Argentina
adopted more risky heterodox policies in an attempt to, "get the econ-
omy moving", the impression was that the IMF vacillated. The IMF
became increasingly uncomfortable assisting given this policy direction
but was also acutely aware that if it did withdraw it would likely cause
a massive liquidity run that would have prompted a major crisis and de-
fault. Each policy development in Argentina was greeted by an analysis
of whether this would be approved of by the Fund and if not whether
the Fund would withdraw. It was rumoured that an ingeneous export
subsidy and import tax policy that used the dollar/euro exchange rate
to ﬁx the leves of taxes and subsidies might be interpreted by the IMF as
a dual exchange rate policy and hence provoke the end of the IMF pro-
gram. This then helped to spark a bank run as bank depositors realized
that if the Fund withdrew and default loomed, banks’ exposure to Gov-
ernment assetts implied that depositor conﬁscation was likely. In fact
the bank run of July/August 2001, was halted by an IMF package. This
package has been criticized and indeed was labelled by Mussa (2002) as
the worst decision that the IMF has ever made. Unfortunately the bank
run did serious damage to the real economy and things got worse rather
than better until the IMF ﬁnally withdrew in late November heralding
another bank run that then forced the authorities to implement a set
of banking controls. The controls were deeply unpopular and helped
topple the Government. The new Government defaulted but after only
a couple of weeks was out of power and the subsequent Government de-
faulted and "pessiﬁed" domestic dollar contracts in the ﬁnancial system
and elsewhere.
28In the case of Argentina, the IMF found itself exactly in the diﬃcult
position between attempting to deliver liquidity protection but fearing
moral hazard as depicted in the theoretical analysis above. Moreover
the reaction of the private sector to the rumours of IMF withdrawal
and then the August IMF package halting a major bank run, backs up
q u i t ec l o s e l yt h er o l eo ft h eI M Fa ss u g g e s t e di nt h em o d e la so n eo f
coordinating the private sector.
However, the deeper point suggested by the analysis is that the inter-
national ﬁnancial architecture remains incomplete. On the one hand,
a lack of cooperation between countries and the IMF may result in a
mixed strategy equilibrium and it is questionable whether such an out-
come would back strongly the role of the IMF. On the other hand,
while cooperation leading to the First Best may well provide a strong
justiﬁcation for the IMF’s existence, cooperation may break down if the
probability of insolvency rises, placing the Fund in a very diﬃcult po-
sition indeed. Recently, Anne Krueger and others have suggested that
the introduction of an SDRM (sovereign debt restructuring mechanism),
by providing a cleaner way to restructure obligations, may tempt coun-
tries into defaulting earlier and help avoid a situation where a country
chooses to soldier on regardless, perhaps only to make things worse22.
The game above potentially allows us to think through how generous
or tough such a mechanism should be. Roughly speaking, the SDRM
mechanism would need to be suﬃciently generous to tempt countries
into choosing that mechanism rather than deviation at the point where
otherwise the country would have deviated. On the other hand, the
SDRM should never be more generous than the First Best. However,
naturally the game would have to be adapated as if an SDRM mechanism
were put in place that satisﬁed these constraints then the private sector
would anticipate this outcome ex ante, and ﬁx interest rates accordingly
and the country would anticipate that outcome in thinking about when
to deviate.
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the SDRM proposals
as they stand (that would deserve another paper), suﬃce to say that it is
not clear that the proposals on the table would satisfy these constraints.
In thinking about the Argentine case, we are saying that at the time
that Argentina started to adopt more and more risky strategies, then to
22Krueger (2002) for example notes that, "Indeed, it (debt restructuring) is so
painful that sovereigns typically put oﬀ the day of reckoning beyond the point when
there are any reasonable prospects of the situation correcting itself." On the SDRM
proposals see IMF (2001) and (2002) and Rogoﬀ and Zettelmeyer (2002) for a re-
view and historical background. See also Bolton (2003) for motivation considering
corporate bankruptcy procedures.
29have reduced the ﬁnal costs of the crisis, an SDRM should have been just
preferred for Argentina than the course of action taken. Put crudely,
for this to have been the case, we would suggest that it would have had
to have given a reasonable probability of the Government of the day
surviving through the application of that mechanism. This implies a
reasonably generous mechanism and it is not clear that the actual SDRM
being discussed would have resulted in that outcome. However, having
said that it may still be the case that an SDRM would have helped had
it been available. It may not solve the underlying problem developed
in this paper, but it may still increase ex ante welfare for the parties
concerned if it, for example, reduced the probability or magnitude of
liquidity runs as the IMF withdraws after deviation.
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